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It is known that incompleteness of Hoare’s logic relative to certain data type 
specifications can occur due to the ability of partial correctness assertions to code 
unsolvable problems; cf. Andreka, Nemeti, and Sain (1979, Lecture Notes in Com- 
puter Science Vol. 74, pp. 208-218, Springer-Verlag, New York/Berlin) and 
Bergstra and Tucker (1982, Theore/. Comput. Sci. 17, 303-315). We improve what 
we think are the main known theorems of this kind, showing that they depend only 
on very weak assumptions on the data type specification (ensuring the ability to 
simulate arbitrarily long finite initial segments of the natural numbers with suc- 
cessor), and pointing out that the recursion theoretic strength of the obtained 
results can be increased. (i? 1988 Academic Press, Inc 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Hoare (1969) proposed the well-known calculus bearing his name as a 
formal tool for proving partial correctness assertions (briefly, p.c.a.‘s) for 
programs in a compositional way (that is, following the syntactical struc- 
ture of programs). At the same time, the calculus was meant to provide a 
so-called axiomatic semantics for programs. For these reasons, Hoare’s 
calculus was considered to have a fundamental importance, and became 
the subject of many theoretical investigations; cf. Apt (1981) and Hare1 
(1979). 
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Hoare’s calculus uses a programming language PL to write down the 
programs, and an assertion language AL whose formulas serve to specify 
properties of data types and execution states. For the rest of the paper, we 
make the usual assumption that AL is a first-order language. Hence, first- 
order structures will serve for us as models of data types. 
Cook (1979) has shown that Hoare’s calculus for while programs is 
sound and complete relative to expressive structures, that is, structures 
whose first-order language is strong enough to define the input-output 
relation for programs in PL. More precisely, for any expressive structure 
Iu, a given p.c.a. is provable from the first-order theory Th(2I) in Hoare’s 
system iff it is valid in (2I. The “only if” part corresponds to soundness and 
holds for arbitrary structures. The “if” part relies on expressiveness and 
holds not only for while programs, but also for other programming 
languages. 
Not every programming language admits a Hoare’s calculus that is 
sound and relatively complete in Cook’s sense; cf. Clarke (1985). For the 
case of while programs, the relationship between the expressiveness of a 
given structure 2I and the completeness of Hoare’s calculus relative to the 
first-order theory of !!I has been investigated by several authors; see, e.g., 
(Bergstra and Tucker, 1982a,b; Rodriguez-Artalejo, 1985). Hoare’s calculus 
turned out to be incomplete relative to many nonexpressive structures. 
This can be understood from two points of view. Model-theoretically, 
the trouble is that certain intermediate or invariant assertions may be 
undefinable in the first-order assertion language; Wand’s (1978) incom- 
pleteness result is obtained in this way. Recursion-theoretically, the point is 
that the set of p.c.a.‘s valid in a given structure VI may code unsolvable 
problems, which forces it to be nonrecursively enumerable, while the set of 
p.c.a.‘s provable from Th(A) will be recursively enumerable if Th(A) is. 
In this paper we improve what we think are the main incompleteness 
results for Hoare’s logic obtained according to the just-mentioned recur- 
sion theoretic idea. More precisely, we consider the following two 
theorems: 
B & T (Bergstra and Tucker, 1982~). Let ‘3 be any first-order structure 
such that Th(2I) is decidable and the halting problem from recursion theory 
is many-one reducible to the (suitably defined) halting problem of Cu. Then 
the set PCTh(‘%) of all p.c.a.‘s for while programs valid in ‘3 is co-r.e. com- 
plete, so that the set HPr(%) of all p.c.a.‘s for while programs provable from 
Th(VI) in Hoare’s calculus, as well any other r.e. subset of PCTh(2I) 
extending it must be different from PCTh(2I). Moreover, HPr(2I) is recur- 
sively inseparable from \ PCTh( ‘?I), so that every r.e. subset H of PCTh(%) 
extending HPr(‘?I) must be undecidable. 
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A &N & S (Andreka, Nemeti, and Sain, 1979). Assume an assertion 
language AL including a constant 0 and a unary function symbol SW. Let n 
stand for the term suc(suc(~~~(suc(O))~~~)) (n times). Let SP be any 
specification in AL which proves m # n for every m #n and has a model % 
where each element is the value of some term n. Put HPr(SP) for the set of 
all p.c.a.‘s provable from SP in Hoare’s calculus; PCTh(SP) for the set of all 
p.c.a.‘s valid in all models of SP; and H, for the set of all p.c.a.‘s {true} 
S{ u = v} belonging to PCTh(SP) and such that S is a while program that ter- 
minates in ‘%!I for every input. Then, no subset H of PCTh(SP) extending H, 
can be r.e. In particular, PCTh(SP) is not r.e. and will differ from HPr(SP) 
provided that SP is r.e. 
(Actually, A & N & S stated their result in a slightly different way and 
allowed a term t(x) in the variable x to play the role of sue above). 
In Definition 4.1 we state the weak successor axioms Sue, (k E N ), with 
the property that every model of Sue, must include a copy of at least 
the first k + 1 natural numbers with successor. This allows us to obtain 
results similar to B & T and A &N & S (cf. Theorems 4.1 and 4.3, and 
Corollary 4.1) but putting more emphasis in the strength of the recursion 
theoretical conclusions and with some gain of generality: Contrary to 
B & T, we do not restrict ourselves to single structures; and contrary to 
A & NS, we do not need a fixed model of the specification to simulate all 
the natural numbers. Consequently, our results yield some new incom- 
pleteness examples not covered by previously known theorems. Moreover, 
we emphasize that the results are quite independent from Hoare’s calculus 
and the particular programming language used (provided it is able to 
simulate while programs), and we prove a technical result that we believe 
to be an interesting generalization of another one by Bergstra and Tucker 
(cf. Bergstra and Tucker, 1982c, Theorem 3.4, and our Theorem 4.2). 
2. PRELIMINARIES ON HOARE'S LOGIC 
We assume that the basic notions of mathematical logic, such as 
similarity type, first-order language, terms, formulas, structures, are known 
to the reader. We use letters U, v, MI, x, y, z for variables; s, t for terms; 
P, Q for formulas; ‘?I for structures. States over %!I are mappings cx V+ A 
assigning values to variables. We also put St(%) for the set of all states 
over ‘5 Finally, we use such notations as f, f *I = f for a function symbol f 
and the function interpreting it in the structure 2L 
The results we are going to discuss make sense for any reasonable 
programming language PL which is strong enough to simulate while 
programs. Technical details in this respect are not going to be important, 
but to fix ideas let us state: 
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DEFINITION 1. An admissible programming language PL determines for 
any fixed similarity type a set of programs (also denoted by PL, to simplify 
notation) such that: 
(a) PL is decidable and includes programs able to simulate all while 
programs (cf. Wand, 1978) of the same similarity type. 
(b) PL has a relafional semantics: The meaning of a program SE PL 
in a structure 2f is a relation S”’ C St(Z) x St(%). 
(c) Every program SE PL uses a finite set X= var(S) of variables; 
the semantics of S does not depend on variables outside from var(S). 
Cf. (Olderog, 1983) for an exact definition. 
(d) For every SE PL there is a computable sequence of assertions 
Conv,,(.f, j) such that the infinite disjunction 
V Convs.kk V) 
kchl 
defines SW in any structure ‘u. Here, X, jj are tuples of variables of the same 
length, corresponding respectively to the initial final state of variables in 
var(S) and Conv,,(Z, j$ intuitively asserts the existence of a terminating 
computation converting X into jj in at most k steps. 
For the rest of the paper, let PL stand for an admissible programming 
language, with first-order assertion language AL. We shall continue using 
such notations as X, j for tuples of variables. Assertion sets SP c AL will 
be called specljiications. 
Partial correctness assertions are triples { P f S( Q > where P, Q are asser- 
tions and S is a program. Partial correctness theories of structures and 
specifications are defined as 
The condition for (P> S( Q 1 to be true in ‘u is the usual one and can be 
formalized by requiring that 
is valid in 2I for every k E N. 
The usual axioms and inference rules of Hoare’s partial correctness 
cafculus for while programs can be found in Wand (1978) or Apt (1981). 
The set of p.c.a.‘s provable in this calculus using formulas from Th(%) 
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(resp. formulas deduced from SP in the calculus for first-order logic) as 
premises for the rule of consequence is denoted by 
HPr(2I) (resp. HPr(SP)). 
Moreover, in the sequel we shall use these notations in a more general 
sense. Following an idea from Bergstra and Tiuryn (1984) we define: 
DEFINITION 2. A sound and effective partial correctness calculus for PL, 
AL gives (uniformly for every similarity type) a recursively enumerable 
(r.e.) binary relation Pu between assertions and p.c.a.‘s, such that 
SP+-Rand Pu(R, {P} S{Q}) implies {P} S{ Q} E PCTh(SP). 
Provability of p.c.a.‘s with respect to the calculus PO is then defined by 
HPr(9I)=({P}S(Q}~Po(R,(P}S{Q})forsomeR~Th(2I)} 
HPr(SP)={{P}~{Q}~Pu(R,{P}S{Q})forsomeRsuchthatSP~R}. 
In the case of Hoare’s calculus for while programs, Pu could be defined 
as follows: 
Pu(R, {P} s{Q}) iff there is a proof of {P> S(Q) in Hoare’s 
calculus using as premises for the rule of consequence some for- 
mulas which are provable from R in the first-order calculus. 
For the rest of the paper, we fix some sound and effective partial 
correctness calculus for PL, AL which is able to prove all p.c.a.‘s for while 
programs provable in standard Hoare’s calculus. 
The condition for (P} S{ Q> to be true in an arbitrary structure does 
depend only on the first-order formulas Conv,:,. Hence, PCTh(2I) is also 
determined by Th(2I) and can be seen as a particular case of PCTh(SP) for 
SP = Th(‘2I). We shall consider mainly the SP case in what follows. 
The following technical lemma will be needed later. 
LEMMA 1. Let Th(SP) denote the set of formulas provable from SP in 
the first-order calculus. Then: 
(a) PCTh(SP) is co-r.e. in Th(SP). Moreover, it is co-r.e. ifTh(SP) is. 
(b) HPr(SP) is r.e. in Th(SP). Moreover, it is r.e. ifTh(SP) is. 
Proof According to the already given definitions, 
{P} S{ Q} E PCTh(SP) iff for all k E N: VX, j (P(X) A Conv,,(%, 7) 
--t Q (9)) E Th(SP) 
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and 
(P} S{ Q} HPr(SP) iff there is some R E AL such that SP t- R and 
Pv(R W W>). I 
3. PRELIMINARIES ON RECURSION THEORY 
In this section we recall some known notions and results from recursion 
theory and computability with while programs, which shall be used in the 
sequel. We fix an arbitrary admissible enumeration {pi ( i E N > of the partial 
recursive functions; cf. Rogers (1958). { W, 1 z’E N }, where IV, is pi’s 
definition domain, enumerates the recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets. 
THEOREM 1. Consider the structure ‘3 = (N, 0, sue) of similarity type 
{ 0, sue }. There is a while program U = U( x, , x2, y, j) of the same similarity 
type, such that: 
(a) U”(i, j, 0,8) terminates iff p,(j) is defined, and computes p,(j) in 
y if that is the case, i.e., U” computes the universal partial recursive function. 
(b) U uses only assignments and tests of the form 
w:=o w  := w’ w  := suc( w’) w=w’ w  = 0, 
where w, w’ are two different variables occurring in U. 
(c) U can be written as 
y := 0; j := 0; U,; while y1 = 0 do U, od, 
where y, is the first variable from the tuple y and U,, U, do not use any 
while constructs. 
Proof It is known that zero, successor, and the control facilities of 
while programs suffice to program all partial recursive functions (cf., e.g., 
Shepherdson and Sturgis, 1963). On the other side, while programs can be 
transformed to equivalent ones without nested loops (cf., e.g., Mirkowska, 
1977). The conditions in parts (b) and (c) have been chosen for technical 
reasons, to simplify the constructions in Theorem 4.1. 1 
DEFINITION 1 (Rogers, 1967). Let A, B be sets of natural numbers. 
(a) A is productive iff there is some total recursive function f, called 
productive function for A, such that for every r.e. index i such that Wi E: A 
holds f(i) E A\ Wi. Intuitively: There is an effective way of proving that A 
cannot be exhausted by any r.e. set. 
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(b) (A, B) is an effectively inseparable pair of sets iff A, B are dis- 
joint and there is a total recursive function g such that for any pair of r.e. 
indices i, j such that A c Wi, BG IV,, and Win W,= 0 holds g(i, j) $ 
W,u W,. In particular, no recursive set R can separate A from B, then 
Wi = R and W, = \ R would contradict our assumptions on g. 
DEFINITION 2 (Rogers, 1967; Smullyan, 1961). Let A, B, C, D be sets of 
natural numbers. 
(a) A is reducible to B iff there is some total recursive reduction 
function f such that, for every number n: n E A iff f(n) E B. 
(b) The pair (A, B) is reducible to (C, D) iff there is some total 
recursive reduction function g such that g(A) c C and g(B) c D. 
(c) B is an r.e.-complete set iff B is r.e. and any other r.e. set A is 
reducible to B. 
(d) (C, D) is an r.e.-complete pair iff (C, D) is a pair of disjoint r.e. 
sets and any other pair (A, B) of disjoint r.e. sets is reducible to (C, 0). 
THEOREM 2 (Rogers, 1967; Smullyan, 1961). (a) A set is r.e.-complete 
iff A is r.e. and \A is productive. The diagonal set 
K= (ilo, isdefined} 
is r.e.-complete. The identity function is a productive function for \K. 
(b) If A is reducible to A’ and productive, then A’ is also productive. 
(c) Both components C, D of any r.e.-complete pair are r.e.-complete 
sets. Kleene’s pair (K,, K, ), with 
K,= {ilpi(i)= j} (j=O. 1) 
is r.e.-complete. 
(d) Let (A, B > and (A’, B’ ) be disjoint pairs. If (A, B > is reducible 
to (A’, B’) and effectively inseparable, then (A’, B’) is also effectively 
inseparable. 
Without going into technical details, we shall assume that the just-stated 
results can be applied to sets of formal expressions (e.g., assertions or 
p.c.a.‘s) via some appropriate Godelization. In the next section, we are 
going to use the sets K, K,,, K, and reduction functions based on the 
universal program U to derive incompleteness results for effective partial 
correctness calculi. 
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4. INCOMPLETENESS RESULTS 
In this section we make use of the following fact. Assume that p,(j) 
terminates. Then the call U%(i, j, 0,U) to the universal program computes 
p,(j) in any structure 8 whose similarity type contains the symbols 0 and 
sue and such that the interpretations of 0 and sue in CL1 generate up to 
isomorphism sufficiently large initial segments of the “true” natural num- 
bers. This is because U’s computation in the intended standard model ‘8 
halts in some finite number of steps and consequently uses some finite 
number of numbers only. We start by giving some first-order axioms whose 
models must include sufficiently large initial segments of ‘%. 
To simplify the notation, we assume that the similarity type includes a 
constant 0 and a unary function symbol sue. These assumptions will be 
relaxed later. 
DEFINITION 1 (weak successor axioms). For any natural number k, let 
WeakOneOne, NoLoops, be the sentences 
vx, y(x #sue(x) A y #sue(y) A sue(x) = sue(y) -+ x = y) 
Vx(x # 0 -+ 0 #sue(x)) A /j (sue’(0) zsuc’+ ‘(0)) 
O<i-ck 
respectively, and define the kth weak successor axiom as 
Sue, = WeakOneOne A NoLoops,. 
LEMMA 1. Let % be any model of Sue,. Then, the part of % generated by 
the interpretations of 0 and sue is either isomorphic to ‘3 or consists of a 
copy of the numbers 0, . . . . I for some I Z k. In the last case, the interpretation 
of suc in ‘?I maps i into i + 1 for any i < I, and 1 into 1. 
Prooj Assume that Sue, is true in ‘?I. Define a countable sequence a, of 
elements belonging to ‘8’s domain by 
a, = 0” a;, , = suc%(a;). 
We say that the first k + 1 members of this sequence are pairwise dif- 
ferent. This is obvious for k = 0, so assume k > 0. By induction on i < k, we 
prove that a,,, . . . . ai are different. Because of NoLoops,, this holds for i = 1. 
Consider then i+ 1 <k with ia 1. By induction hypothesis, ai # a,, so 
ai+ 1 # a, by NOLOOPS,. We still have to prove that ai+ 1 # aj+ 1 for j < i. 
But a, # ai+, and aj # aj+ , by NoLoops,, so ai+, # aj+ 1 by WeakOneOne 
and the induction hypothesis. 
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If the sequence is isomorphic to ‘Jz, we are ready. Otherwise, choose the 
least number I such that a,, . . . . a, are different, but a,, , equals some uj with 
j d 1. We already know that 1 cannot be less than k, and it is easily seen that 
WeakOneOne forces a,, , to equal a,. This completes the lemma. 1 
DEFINITION 2. Let SP be any specification. We say that SP simulates 
arbitrary segments of the natural numbers iff SP v {Sue,) has some model 
‘i!& for every k E N. 
We are now in position to formulate our main result. 
THEOREM 1 (incompleteness theorem). Let SP be any spectficution that 
simulates arbitrary segments of the natural numbers. There are two fixed 
while programs S, T using variables u, v (among others) and a computable 
sequence {Pi 1 i E N } of preconditions, such that for every i E N the following 
holds: 
(4 i~\K*(P,}S{u=u}~PCTh(~) 
ie K* {Pi} S{u=u) E\PCTh(SP) 
(b) iEKo+ {P,} T{u=u}~HPr(0) 
iEK,*{Pi} T(u=o}E\PCTh(SP). 
Moreover, S terminates in any structure generated by the interpretations of 0 
and sue for any initial state which satisfies any of the preconditions P,. 
Before proving the theorem, let us discuss its main consequences. Put 
H,={{Pi}S{u=u}~i~N}nPCTh(@) 
HD={(Pi} T{u=u}jiEN}nHPr(lZ() 
HN={{P,} T{u=u}liEN/)n\PCTh(SP). 
According to the recursion theoretic difficulty of Th(SP), one gets different 
“abstract incompleteness results.” More precisely: 
COROLLARY 1. Let SP, Ho, HD, HN be us above. Then: 
(a) Without any additional assumptions. 
(a.1) Every set H with HO E HE PCTh(SP) is productive. 
(a.2) (HD, HN) and any bigger pair of disjoint sets of p.c.a.‘s is 
effectively inseparable. In particular, HD is r.e. but not recur- 
sive. 
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(b) Assuming that Th(SP) is r.e., 
(b.1) HPr(SP) is a r.e. set strictly included in PCTh(SP). Given any 
r.e. index for Th(SP), one can compute another index e such 
that {P,) s{u=u)~PCTh(fa)\HPr(SPf. 
(b.2) HPr(SP) is r.e. but not recursive. 
(c) Assuming that Th(SP) is co-r.e. 
(~1) PCTh(SP) is a co-r.e.-complete set. 
(c.2) HD and HN are r.e.-complete sets. 
(d) Assuming that Th(SP) is recursioe. 
(d.1) HPr(SP) is a r.e.-complete set. 
Proof According to Theorem 1, f and g defined by 
f(i)= (P,} S{u=u}, g(i)= {Pi} T{u=v} 
are reduction functions reducing \K to HO and (K,, K,) to (HD, HN), 
respectively. This proves (a) because of Theorem 3.2. 
Now let Th(SP) be r.e. then HPr(SP) is r.e. by Lemma 2.1 and strictly 
included in PCTh(SP) by (a.1). Moreover, from any given r.e.-index for 
Th(SP), we can compute another r.e.-index e for the set 
By Theorem l(a) and the soundness of the partial correctness calculus, we 
know that Wez \K. Using the fact that the identity is a productive 
function for \K (cf. Theorem 3.2) we get that e E (\K)\ We. By 
Theorem l(a) and the construction of e, this means that {Pe} S{u= II} E 
PCTh(@)\HPr(SP), which stablishes (b.1). To get (b.2) notice that HD E 
HPr(SP) E \HN and apply (a.2). 
Assume now that Th(SP) is co-r.e.; then PCTh(SP) is co-r.e. by 
Lemma 2.1; moreover, \K is reducible to PCTh(SP) by Theorem l(a), 
hence PCTh(SP) is co-r.e.-complete by Theorem 3.2. This proves (c.1). For 
(c.2), we observe that HD, HN are r.e. by Lemma 2.1 and effectively 
inseparable by (a.2); hence, both of them are r.e.-complete by Theorem 3.2. 
Finally, if Th(SP) is recursive, then HPr(SP) and \PCTh(SP) are r.e. by 
Lemma 2.1 and effectively inseparable by (a.2). Hence, the r.e.-completeness 
of HPr(SP) follows again from Theorem 3.2. 1 
These results should be compared with A & N & S and B & T presented 
in the introductory section of this paper. (a.1) has essentially the same 
strength as A & N & S, but is obtained under weaker hypotheses. On the 
other side, the hypotheses in B &T are not exactly of the same kind as 
ours; but their conclusions are covered by our points (a)-(d) particularised 
to the case SP = Th(%). Moreover, all examples shown in Bergstra and 
Tucker (1982~) can be deduced from Corollary 1. 
643/79/l-3 
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Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that SP simulates arbitrary segments of 
the natural numbers. For any k E N, let 91k be a model of SP u (Sue,) 
(remember Definition 2). For any icz N, take 
P,==Suc,+, A x, =suc’(O) A x2=.x,, 
where xi, .x2 are the input variables of the universal program U (cf. 
Theorem 3.1). 
First we give an informal account of the proof. Pi can be read as: “There 
are at least i+ 2 numbers, and the initial value of variables x,, x2 is i.” 
Programs S, T should be imagined to get their input in x,, x2, and will be 
constructed to behave in the following way: 
S: Get input i in X, , x2 ; 
initialize u to value 0; while u # u and the numbers have not got exhausted, 
keep simulating the computation of p,(i) (with the help of the universal 
program U) and counting each simulation step by incrementing U’S value 
(if u reaches u or the numbers get exhausted before the simulation has been 
completed, halt the computation with u= U; consider that the numbers 
have got exhausted if some computation of a successor reproduces its 
input). 
T: Get input i in x1, x2; 
initialize u and o to value 0; while the numbers do not get exhausted, keep 
simulating the computation of pi(i); if the simulation terminates suc- 
cessfully and gives an output different from 0, increment U’S value, so that 
U, o have different values after termination, and halt. 
Conditions (a) and (b) can now be checked as follows: Assume that 
i E \K. Then p,(i) does not terminate. Given any structure ‘9I and any initial 
value of S’s variables satisfying precondition Pi, S will simulate the com- 
putation of p,(i) and will only terminate with u and v set to the same value. 
This proves the first half of (a). 
Assume that ie K. Then p,(i) terminates in 1 steps for some 1. If we 
choose k large enough, ‘QIu, will simulate a “sufficiently big” fragment of the 
natural numbers, and S will be able to start a computation at an initial 
state satisfying Pi and complete the simulation of the computation p,(i), 
halting with U, o set to different values. This proves the second half of (a). 
Assume now that ig KO. Then p,(i) terminates in some number I of steps 
yielding the value 0. Given any structure ‘?I and any initial value of T’s 
variables that satisfies P,, T will simulate the computation of p,(i) and will 
be able to do so for at most k steps, where k is some number which only 
depends on 1 and on the universal program used for the simulation, but not 
on ‘?I or the initial state. After T halts, the variables U, v will have the same 
value, because T only modifies their initial value after successfully com- 
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pleting a simulated computation with a result different from 0. This means 
that {Pi} T{ u = u} E PCTh(0). Moreover, there is a restricted com- 
pleteness theorem for Hoare’s calculus that applies to this situation (see 
Theorem 2 below). Hence, {Pi} T(u = u} E HPr(@), which proves the first 
half of (b). 
Lastly, assume that i E K, . Now p,(i) terminates in 1 steps yielding value 
1 for some 1. For a sufliciently large k, !!II, will include a “big enough” 
segment of the natural numbers, and T will be able to start at some state 
satisfying Pi and successfully complete the simulation of the computation 
p,(i), halting with the variables U, u set to different values. This finishes (b). 
To finish the proof, it is enough to observe that S has the required ter- 
mination property and to show that S, T can be rigorously constructed. 
Remember the universal program U = U(x,, xz, ~1, j). S will use two 
additional variables U, u. More precisely, we take 
s=u :=o; 
y:=();j:=@u” 
01 
whiIey,=OAu#v 
do u := SW(U); U; od 
where Vo, U; are the result of replacing each assignment 
w  := suc(w’) 
occurring in U, (resp. U, ) by 
w  := suc(w’); 
ifw=w’thenu:=ufi 
T will use still another additional variable z-. We take 
T=u:=O;u:=O;z:=O; 
y:=o;y:=fj;u;;; 
whiley,=Or\z=O 
do U; od; 
ifz=Or\y#Othenu:=suc(u)fi 
where Ui, U; are the result of replacing each assignment 
W’ := suc( w) 
occurring in U, (resp. U, ) by 
M’ := suc( w’); 
if w = W’ then z := sue(0) fi 
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The reader may check that these definitions do indeed correspond to the 
informal descriptions of behaviour given above. i 
We state now the announced restricted completeness theorem, that 
generalizes Theorem 3.4 in Bergstra and Tucker (1982~). 
THEOREM 2 (restricted completeness theorem). Assume a p.c.a. 
(I’} S{ Q} belonging to PCTh(SP) and such that two conditions hold: 
( 1) S is a while program. 
(2) S terminates in a uniformly bounded number of steps for any initial 
state that satisfies P. More exactly, there is a natural number k such that the 
first-order assertion 
Halt,,: VX( P(X) -+ 3j Conv,,(.?, j)) 
belongs to Th(SP). 
Under these hypotheses, {P} S(Q) E HPr(SP). 
ProojI Clearly, it is enough to prove that the given p.c.a. can be proved 
from SP in the classical Hoare’s calculus for while programs. Let us do this 
by induction on S. 
For S = xj := t, the hypothesis implies that the sentence VX(P + Q[t/xj]) 
belongs to Th(SPf. Then, {P} X, := t{Q} follows from the assignment 
axiom and the rule of consequence. 
The case S= if E then S, else S2 fi reduces easily to the induction 
hypothesis for S, and S,, by using the conditional rule. 
For S = S, ; S? we consider the new p.c.a.‘s 
(P) s, (R’i and {R) h(Q), 
- - 
where R = R(x) = Z(P[?/.U] A Conv,,(z, x)). The hypothesis of the 
theorem and the construction of this intermediate assertion clearly guaran- 
tee that the two new p.c.a.‘s verify again the hypothesis of the theorem. We 
can then apply the induction hypothesis and the composition rule. 
Finally, assume S = while E do S1 od and consider the new p.c.a. 
{R A E} S,(R), 
where 
R=R(.f)=& PC-//x] A v 3u, ,..., u, u,=?A u,=?c 
( Isk ( 
A / j  (E[i$/.f] A cOllVs,,(ti,, ii+ ,)) 
a<(</ 
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The hypothesis of the theorem and the form of this invariant assertion 
ensure that the hypothesis of the theorem holds again for the new p.c.a. 
Moreover, the sentences 
Vlx(P -+ R) and V,x(R A 1 E + Q) 
do belong to Th(SP). We can then apply the induction hypothesis and the 
iteration rule. m 
For the results of this section it is not essential to represent zero and suc- 
cessor through a constant and a unary function symbol belonging to the 
similarity type of the assertion language. The essential idea is the following: 
Precondition Pi must guarantee the existence of at least i+ 2 “numbers” 
generated by some “zero” and some “successor,” and the “successor” of any 
given “number” must be computable in a uniformly bounded number of 
steps. More exactly, the bound has to be independent from the “number” 
whose “successor” is going to be computed, as well from the structure in 
which the computation takes place. Following this idea, we can now relax 
the conditions in Definition 2, obtaining 
DEFINITION 3. Let SP be any specification. We say that SP simulates 
arbitrary segments of the natural numbers in the relaxed sense iff there is a 
while program SUC(.u, y, Z, - U) belonging to SP’s similarity type, with the 
following two properties: 
(a) There is a natural number s, depending only on SUC, such that 
for any structure ‘8 and any initial values a, b, E, d for the variables 
- - 
x9 Y, L-, u, SUC halts in at most s steps without modifying the values a, 2 of 
variables X, -7 and computing some new value a’ into the variable y. Let us 
use the notation 
SUC%(a, C) 
for a’, and imagine SUC%( ., C) as a “successor function” depending on the 
parameters C. 
(b) For every k E N there is some model 2LIk of SP and there are 
elements a,,, C belonging to 911,‘s domain, such that the successor axiom 
Sue, holds in ‘$I, when 0 is interpreted as a, and sue is interpreted as 
sucy .) C). 
We are now in position to modify the proof of Theorem 1, simply by 
replacing all occurrences of sue with the help of SUC. Programs S and T 
will get some additional variables (corresponding to those in SUC) and all 
occurrences of 0 will have to be replaced by some new variable x,,. Precon- 
ditions Pi will be modified accordingly; occurrences of sue in Pi must be 
replaced with the help of the formula Convsuc,., which expresses the input- 
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output behaviour of SUC because of our hypothesis on the bound s. 
Occurrences of 0 in Pi will also be replaced by x0. In this way, Theorem 1 
generalizes to 
THEOREM 3 (relaxed incompleteness theorem). The conclusions from 
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 do still hold under the weaker hypothesis that SP 
simulates arbitrary segments of the natural numbers in the relaxed sense. 
The simplest way of realizing the hypothesis of this theorem is to take as 
the program SUC simply an assignment 
y := f(x, 5) 
where f is some (n + 1)-ary function symbol in the similarity type. Of 
course, SW is a particular case of this. 
5. SOME EXAMPLES 
In this section we present a series of incompleteness examples which 
follow from Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 and their common Corollary 4.1. Some 
of them were already known, while others seem to be new and illustrate the 
fact that very weak specifications may still satisfy our requirements on the 
successor. 
EXAMPLE 1. Similarity Type: Arbitrary, but including some (n + l)-ary 
function symbol f (n 2 0). 
Specification: 0 
Successor Program: y := f (x, Z) 
Results: Th(SP) is r.e. Corollary 4.1(a),(b) do apply. 
EXAMPLE 2. Similarity Type: { f }, h w  ere f is a unary function symbol. 
Specification: Two possibilities: 
2.1. @ 
2.2. The theory of the class of all finite structures. 
Successor Program: y := f(x). 
Results: Th( SP) is recursive (Ehrenfeucht, 1959). Corollary 4.1 (a)( b)(c) 
(d) do apply. 
EXAMPLE 3. Similarity Type: As in Example 2. 
Specification: 
3x, v’x f(x) # xg 
vx, y(f(x)=f(y)+x=y) 
Successor Program: As in Example 2. 
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Results: Th(SP) is a finite extension of specification 2.1, and hence recur- 
sive. Corollary 4.1(a)(b)(c)(d) do apply. 
EXAMPLE 4. Similarity Type: (0, pred}, where pred is a unary function 
symbol. 
Specification: SP = Th( (N, 0, pred)); i.e., the first order theory of the 
natural numbers with zero and predecessor (we assume pred(0) = 0). 
Successor Program: y := p&(x). 
Results: Th(SP) is recursive (it admits elimination of quantifiers, cf. 
Chang and Keisler (1973). Corollary 4.1(a)(b)(c)(d) do apply. 
This follows neither from A&N&S (the standard model does not 
simulate all the natural numbers with successor) nor from B&T (the 
halting problem for while programs on (fV, 0, pred), in the sense of 
Bergstra and Tucker (1982~) is trivially decidable). 
EXAMPLE 5. Similarity Type: Including a constant 0 and a binary 
function symbol +. 
Specification: Several possibilities, all of them yielding a recursive theory: 
5.1. Presburger’s arithmetic (Presburger, 1929). 
5.2. Algebraically closed fields of characteristic 0 (Tarski, 1951). 
5.3. Real closed fields (Tarski, 1951). 
5.4. Abelian groups (Szmielew, 1953). 
Successor Program: y := x + z (simulates the successor for appropriate 
values of 2). 
Results: Corollary 4.1(a)(b)(c)(d) do apply. 
Notice that 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 correspond to the examples presented by 
Bergstra and Tucker (1982~). Being complete, each of the three theories 
equals the theory of one of its models. 
EXAMPLE 6. Similarity Type: Including at least a (n + 1 )-ary function 
symbol (pz Z 1) and no predicate symbols. 
Specification: 
V.?, y(f(x)=f(y) +X=j) for each f, 
VX, j f(Z) # g(y) for each f different from g, 
V’x f(X) # c for each f, c, c # d for each c different from d, 
VX xi # t(x) for t term, xi occurring in 2. 
Successor Program: y := f(x, F), 
Results: Models of SP are called fucally free structures. Th(SP) is recur- 
sive, as well as Th(2l) for any model ‘% of SP (Mal’cev, 1962). 
Corollary 4.1(a)(b)(c)(d) do apply. 
Notice that LISP-like symbolic expressions generated by certain atoms 
and a cons function symbol form a locally free (and even a free) structure. 
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EXAMPLE 7. Similarity Type: 10, + }, where 0 is a constant and + is a 
binary function symbol. 
Specification: The Theory of the class of all finite Abelian groups. 
Successor Program: if x + z = 0 then y := x else y := I + z. 
Results: Th(SP) is recursive (Ershov, 1963), and taking as aLk the finite 
abelian group of the integers modulo k + 2, one sees that SP simulates 
arbitrary segments of the natural numbers in the relaxed sense. 
Corollary 4.1(a)(b)(c)(d) do apply. 
EXAMPLE 8. Similarity Type: {e, sO, s, }, where e is a constant and sr,, s, 
are unary function symbols. 
Specification: Three possibilities: 
8.1. The theory of the class of all m-thin binary trees. 
8.2. The theory of the class of all finite m-thin binary trees. 
8.3. The theory of the class of all infinite m-thin binary trees (see 
below for a definition). 
Successor Program: 
if x = so(x) 
then y := .Y 
else if so(x) = so(so(.x)) 
then y := sI(x) 
else y := so(x) 
fi 
ti 
Results: Th(SP) is recursive and the just given program SUC serves to 
simulate arbitrary segments of the natural numbers, provided that n>,2 
(see below for a justification). Consequently, Corollary 4.1(a)(b)(c)(d) do 
apply. 
DEFINITION AND JUSTIFICATION TO EXAMPLE 8. Thefull binary tree is the 
structure 23 = (B, e, sO, s, ), where B is the set of all binary words over the 
alphabet {O, I}, e is the empty word, and s,,, s, are the operations defined 
by S,,(W) = ~0, S,(W) = w  1. Binary trees are structures corresponding to 
subtrees of the full binary tree in the usual sense, with the convention that 
s~(w)=s,(w)=w if w  is a leaf, and sO(w)=wO, s,(w)=wl otherwise. 
Let m 2 1 be given. A tree is called m-thin iff for any given node of the 
tree, each one of the two successors sO, s1 can be iterated at most m times. 
This property can be formulated as a first order axiom. Moreover, using a 
technique of Rabin (1965), the theories of the three specifications given in 
Example 8 can be interpreted in the monadic second-order theory of 8, 
which is recursive (Rabin, 1969). 
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The following picture might help to understand the idea behind the 
successor program in Example 8. It shows a 2-thin tree, where black nodes 
are leafs and arrows correspond to the successor computed by the 
program. 
FIGURE 1 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED WORK 
Because in practice every specification will have a recursively enumerable 
theory, it seems interesting to investigate the limitations of partial 
correctness calculi when used in cooperation with such specifications. This 
question is not answered by relative completeness results in Cook’s sense. 
We have improved results by Andreka, Ntmeti, and Sain (1979) and 
Bergstra and Tucker (1982c), showing that quite strong incompleteness 
theorems hold under very weak hypothesis which are satisfied by almost all 
nontrivial specifications with a r.e. theory. For arbitrary specifications, we 
still obtain some information about the recursion theoretic difficulty of the 
corresponding partial correctness logic. Moreover, we have emphasized the 
recursion theoretic strength of the results and the independence from most 
particular features of the programming language and partial correctness 
calculus used. 
The technical idea of using diagonalization arguments to derive incom- 
pleteness results for Hoare logics based on r.e. specifications has been suc- 
cinctly discussed by Apt, Bergstra, and Meertens (1979). Incompleteness 
results for Hoare’s logic with while programs have been investigated by 
different authors. Bergstra and Tucker (1982~) noticed that decidability of 
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PCTh(%) relative to Th(‘3l) is a necessary condition for Hoare’s calculus to 
be complete relative to ‘3. Bergstra, Chmielinska, and Tiuryn (1982) 
showed, however, that the condition is not sufficient. Another necessary 
condition for Hoare’s logic to be complete relative to Iu is PC-compactness, 
which has been investigated by Bergstra and Tiuryn (1984). This last paper 
presents a structure ?I with following properties: (i) ‘?I is PC-compact; (ii) 
PCTh(ZI) is recursive relative to Th@l); (iii) Hoare’s calculus (for while 
programs) is incomplete relative to 2l; (iv) there is an effective partial 
correctness calculus which is sound and complete relative to 9l. According 
to our results, Th(2l) cannot be r.e.; in fact, it includes the first-order 
theory of the standard model of arithmetic and is highly undecidable. 
Some completeness results for Hoare logics are known, too. For 
instance, Bergstra and Tucker (1982a) proved that every specification SP 
having infinite models only has some conservative extension SP’ such that 
Hoare’s calculus is complete relative to SP’. They asked whether SP’ could 
be chosen as a r.e. set. The results of the present paper answer this question 
negatively. Other completeness results for Hoare’s logic (and more 
generally, for logics of programs going beyond partial correctness) have 
been obtained through a change of the semantic viewpoint, according to 
so-called axiomatic semantics (cf. Bergstra and Tucker, 1984; Leivant, 
1985) or nonstandard semantics (cf., e.g., Andreka, Nemeti, and Sain, 1982; 
Hortali-Gonzalez and Rodriguez-Artalejo, 1985; Pasztor, 1986, 1987; 
where many other references are given). In such approaches, the price paid 
for completeness is that program computations conform to a time scale 
internal to each model and not necessarily identical to the standard time 
scale modeled by natural numbers. The semantical change makes it difficult 
to establish comparisons, but the results of this paper still ensure that the 
set of p.c.a.‘s provable in such a system from some r.e. specification SP will 
generally be strictly included in the standard partial correctness theory 
PCTh(SP). The reason is that provability of p.c.a.‘s in the system will still 
define an effective partial correctness calculus. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
We thank an anonymous referee for criticism and suggestions concerning a first version of 
this paper. 
RECEIVED January 21, 1986; ACCEPTED January 7, 1988 
REFERENCES 
ANDR~KA, H.. N~METI. I., AND SAIN. I. (1979), Completeness problems in verification of 
programs and program schemes, in “Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science” 
GENERAL INCOMPLETENESS RESULTS 41 
(J. Bicvar, Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 74, pp. 208-218, Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin/New York. 
AND~~KA, H.. NBMETI, I., AND SAIN, I. (1982) A complete logic for reasoning about 
programs via nonstandard model theory, Parts I, II, Theoret. Cotnput. Sci. 17, 193-212, 
259-278. 
APT, K. R. (1981), Ten years of Hoare’s logic: A Survey-Part I, ACM TOPLAS 3, 431483. 
APT. K. R.. BERGSTRA, J. A., AND MEERTENS, L. G. T. (1979) Recursive assertions are not 
enough-Or are they?, Theorer. Comput. Sci. 8, 73-87. 
BERGSTRA, J. A., CHMIELINSKA. A., AND TIURYN, J. (1982). Another incompleteness result for 
Hoare’s logic, Inform. and Control 52, 159-171. 
BERGSTRA. J. A., AND TIURYN, J. (1984), PC-compactness, a necessary condition for the 
existence of sound and complete logics of partial correctnes, in “Logics of Programs” 
(E. Clarke and D. Kozen, Eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 164, pp. 45-56, 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin/New York. 
BERGSTRA, J. A., AND TUCKER, J. V. (1982a), Two theorems about the completeness of 
Hoare’s logic, Inform. Process. Lett. 15. 143-149. 
BERGSTRA, J. A., AND TUCKER, J. V. (1982b), Expressiveness and the completeness of Hoare’s 
logic, J. Compur. Sysrem Sci. 25, 2677284. 
BERGSTRA. J. A., AND TUCKER, J. V. (1982c), Some natural structures which fail to possess a 
sound and decidable Hoare-like Logic for their while-programs, Theoref. Comput. Sci. 17, 
303-315. 
BERGSTRA. J. A.. AND TUCKER, J. V. (1984) The axiomatic semantics of programs based on 
Hoare’s logic, Acra Inform. 21, 293-320. 
CHANG, C. C., AND KEISLER, H. J. (1973), “Model Theory,” North-Holland. 
CLARKE, JR., E. M. (1985), The characterization problem for Hoare logics, in “Mathematical 
Logic and Programming Languages” (M. Atiyah, C. A. R. Hoare, and J. C. Shepherdson, 
Eds.), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
COOK, S. A. (1979) Soundness and completeness of an axiom system for program verification, 
SIAM J. Comput. 7, 7G90. 
EHRENFEUCHT. A. (1959). Decidability of the theory of one function, Notices Amer. Math. Sot. 
6, 268. 
ERSHOV. Y. L. (1963) Decidability of elementary theories of some classes of abelian groups, 
Algebra i Logika 6, 3741. 
HAREL, D. (1979). “First-Order Dynamic Logic.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 68, 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin/New York. 
HOARE, C. A. R. (1969), An axiomatic basis for computer programming, Comm. ACM 12, 
567-580. 
HORTALA-GONZALEZ. M. T., AND RODRIGUEZ-ARTALEJO, M. (1985), Hoare’s logic for non- 
deterministic regular programs: A nonstandard completeness theorem, in “Proceedings, 
12th ICALP” (W. Brauer, Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 194, pp. 270-280, 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin/New York. 
LEIVANT, D. (1985) Partial correctness theories as first order theories, in “Logics of Programs 
‘85” (R. Parikh, Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 193. pp. 19&195, Springer- 
Verlag, Berlin/New York. 
MAL’CEV, A. I. (1962), Axiomatizable classes of locally free algebras of various types, trans- 
lated from a Russian original, in “The Metamathematics of Algebraic Systems” (B. F. 
Wells, III, Transl. Ed.), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971. 
MIRKOWSKA, G. (1977), Algorithmic logic and its applications in the theory of programs II, 
Fund. Inform. 1, 147-165. 
OLDEROC. E. R. (1983), Note on the notion of expressiveness and the rule of adaptation, 
Theoret. Compul. Sci. 24. 337-347. 
42 HORTAL~~GONZI~LEZ ET AL. 
PASZTOR, A. (1986) Nonstandard algorithmic and dynamic logic, J. Symbolic Compur. 2. 
59-8 1. 
PASZTOR, A. (1987), “Recursive Programs and Denotational Semantics in Absolute Logics of 
Programs,” Technical Report FIU-SCS-87-l. Florida International University. 
PRESBURGER, M. (1929), Uber die Vollstandigkeit eines gewissen Systems der Arithmetik 
ganzer Zahlen, in welcher die Addition als einzige Operation hervortritt, in “Comptes 
Rendus du I Congres des mathtmatiziens des pays slaves.‘* 
RABIN. M. 0. (1965). A simple method for undecidability proofs and some applications, in 
“Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science II” (Y. Bar-Hillel, Ed.), North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
RABIN. M. 0. (1969), Decidabihty of second order theories and automata on infinite trees, 
Trans. Amer. Marh. Sot. 141, 1-35. 
RODRIGUEZ-ARTALEJO, M. (1985), Some questions about expressiveness and relative com- 
pleteness in Hoare’s logic, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 39, 189-206. 
RDGERS, H. (1958), Code1 numberings of partial recursive functions, J. Symbolic Logic 3, 
331-391. 
ROGERS. H. (1967) “Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability,” McGraw- 
Hill, New York. 
SHEPHERDSON, J. C.. AND STURGIS. H. E. (1963) Computability of recursive functions, 
J. Assoc. Cornput Mach. 10, 217-255. 
SHOENFIELD. J. R. (1967), “Mathematical Logic,” Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
SMULLYAN. R. M. (1961). “Theory of Formal Systems,” Annals of Mathematics Studies 
Vol. 47, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ. 
SZMIELEW. W. (1953) Elementary properties of Abelian groups, Fund. Math. 41, 203-271. 
TARSKI. A. (1951), “A Decision Method for Elementary Algebra and Geometry,” 2nd rev. ed., 
Univ. of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles. 
WAND, M. (1978). A new incompleteness result for Hoare’s system, J. Assoc. Compur. Mach. 
25, 168-175. 
